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Abstract 
Soviet foreign policy is a field where theories abund. Most of these theories contend that one 
or  more  factors  are  extremely  important  determinant  factors  for  Soviet  behaviour in  all  or  most 
situations. Soviet foreign policy has usually been analysed in terms of the leader￢™s objectives, 
their perceptions and iniatives in the outer environment of the world politics, and their response to 
development abroad. The main purpose of this article is to briefly examine the internal and external 
factors that shape Soviet foreign policy and behavior, and to analyse the forces that shape Soviet 
international behaviour, focusing on the national interest issue. Why Soviet foreign policy? Because 
we  consider  that  even  a  brief  look  into  the  Soviet  foreign  policy  may  represent  the  key  to 
understanding Russia￢™s current behaviour on the world stage. The first step in constructing viable 
security strategies is to understand the surrounding political world, as well as what Russia was, is and 
could be. 
Keywords:  soviet  foreign  policy,  decision-maker,  country  behaviour,  imperialist 
mindset. 
1. Introduction 
Our  analysis  tackles  Soviet  Russia’s  foreign  policy  behaviour,  starting  from  the 
premises that thoroughly knowing the past is a useful means of understanding the present and, 
especially, predicting the future. It is no longer a secret that now, more than ever in the past 
20 years, we are witnessing a deep change in forces and geopolitical interests and, for this 
reason, we need proper tools that may help us grasp and assess the behaviour of the “other”.  
Our analysis aimed at both critical analysing a vast literature on the topic, and at 
profiling a country’s behaviour; certain analysts have so far considered this profile antiquated, 
but now, given the vicinity, they are under pressure to adapt it. Our approach is an argument 
in favour of the analyses of the recent evolutions embedded in the course of history.   
For a better understanding of our analytical approach we will present the most relevant 
– in our opinion – aspects referring to the main topic – Russia.    
Maybe the best wording to start any material on Russia, be it journalistic or scientific, 
is Winston Churcill’s quote, “a riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma.” 
Russia has always represented a fascination for unknown, vast territories; the mystery 
that surrounded Russia  a few hundred  years is due to  both  vast  lands and to  foreigners’ 
inability to understand the Russian spirit. Russia’s most important weapon (and its greatest 
vulnerability  has  been  and  still  is  space
1.  Tendencies  of  territorial  nationalism  and 
expansionism, a common trait for most European states, have gained unique nuances in 
Russia’s  history.  “The  historic  mission”  of  the  Russian  nation  as  a  representative  and 
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advocate  of  Eastern  Christendom  against  Catholicism  and  Islam  dates  back  to  Ivan  the 
Terrible or Peter the Great’s political visions. 
The Russian peasant, the white aristocrat, the Cossack general, the almighty tsar, the 
Bolshevik, the Trotskyist, the communist, the collectivized peasant, the Russian intellectual 
converted to communism, the Soviet commissar, the Soviet soldier and especially the leaders 
of the communist Soviet elite represent for Westerners as many riddles wrapped in mysteries 
inside enigmas. 
From our point of view, one of the major driving forces for crisis periods during the 
Cold War is the inability or the refusal to “solve” these “riddles.” 
2. Paper Content 
Russian’s foreign policy  
Russian foreign policy has proven a vast field for Western researchers. The Party, the 
ideology, in-fighting, the organisation of the state apparatus, have been studied; models of the 
Soviet decision-making process have been drawn up; Soviet secret services became the key to 
solving unsolvable equations. The inability to predict Soviet actions in foreign policy, or the 
inability to establish an analysis model able to predict on a long or short term the Soviet 
foreign policy decisions were explained through the enigmatic nature of the space in which 
the Soviet political life developed.   
At the end of the forth decade of the last century specialists considered that although 
Soviet foreign policy objectives are clear and coherent on a long term, every day diplomatic 
actions and gestures are whimsical, incoherent and enigmatic.
2  
Studies  on  the  Soviet  foreign  policy  of  the  Cold  War’s  last  decade  launch  the 
hypothesis that long term foreign policy objectives increased and became ambivalent once 
with Westerners’ growing ability to understand every day diplomacy,  which still remains 
contradictory and whimsical even after four decades.  
An increasingly complex foreign policy decisional process is not a characteristic pf 
USSR; it was highlighted in the foreign policy analysis of the great powers.  
Increased academic interest in Soviet foreign policy decision analysis and the need to 
understand, predict, and correctly analyse a certain kind of behaviour on the international 
arena have had to overcome several hindrances such as: reduced amount of materials coming 
right from the source, an insignificant number of monographs and Western analytical studies 
on the fundaments of Soviet foreign policy, an intricate interpretation of available documents.  
At first sight, interpreting available documents may seem a minor issue. In the history 
of  the  Cold  War,  disinformation,  manipulation  and  propaganda  represented  both  parts’ 
favourite methods in their attempt to win people’s “hearts and minds.” Acknowledging the 
constant, frequent use of these methods often led to mistrust and superficial treatment of 
documents or information. To be more specific, we need to say that, especially during crises 
or in moments when quick decisions needed to be taken, politicians, intelligence analysts, 
military strategists treated clear data and documents with mistrust and superficiality, labelling 
them as results of propaganda and disinformation. The fear of falling for the other’s lies 
represented, in our opinion, the main hindrance in analysing and increasing the ability to 
predict the “foe’s” behaviour in the international political game specific to the Cold War 
period.  
It is extremely difficult to analyse available documents. What information do they 
reveal? Is this information the official standpoint? Can this information shape Soviet Union’s 
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true behaviour or is it merely a projection of a desired but difficult to achieve behaviour? How 
can we establish the extent to which the dissemination method, the source of declarations, 
their target, is representative form the perspective of international relations study?  
During the Cold War period, to establish foreign policy objectives meant to analyse 
territorial acquisitions, military bases, alliances, distribution of power and influence, as well 
as their usefulness in increasing power, prestige and security. Ideology, power and fear of the 
other’s  power,  messianism  and  suspicion  shaped  the  national  interests  of  the  two  big 
international actors USA and USSR; the concepts of independence, territorial integrity, power 
and prestige were interpreted in different manner.  
Hartman (1978) said that hardly ever can the interests of two states be totally opposed 
or can they completely  overlap. There  will always  be a third state  and time will change 
motivations, attitudes and behaviours. The fluidity of the process does have certain limits, but 
major changes are possible in defining the national interest, changes that are deeper than the 
public opinion is ready to understand.  
One of the most appreciated Russian geopoliticians, Alexandr Dughin, created in his 
book,  Fundamentals  of  Geopolitics,  possible  scenarios  to  relaunch  “the  Russian  empire.” 
Although more than 20 years have passed since the end of the Cold War and Russia’s road 
has had its ups and downs, today’s geopolitical, political, and economic reality urge us to 
present some of Dughin’s ideas. We need to mention that these ideas are not at all unique, or 
of  current  importance  for  that  matter,  but  they  are  nevertheless  typical  of  the  Russian 
imperialist mindset, they are typical of the manner in which Russian personalities, be they 
tsarist, Soviet or post-Soviet, understood Russia’s long-term future: “the Russian people is so 
tied to the geopolitical reality, that space itself, its internalization, its spiritual perception, has 
given shape to people’s psychology, becoming one of the main determiners for its identity 
and essence… to  give up on the function of creator of the empire means the end of the 
Russian people’s  existence as  a historical  reality, as  a civilising factor, it means  national 
suicide.”    
The solution to the enigma, mystery, riddle that Russia represents is given by the great 
politician  Winston  Churchill.  The  key  to  decoding  the  Russian  behaviour  is  its  national 
interest.  From  our  point  of  view  (tsarist,  Soviet,  today’s),  Russia’s  national  interest  is 
conquering and dominating the Euro-Asian space.  
Western studies on Soviet foreign policy 
The vast Russian space has always raised the interest of scientists, diplomats or simple 
travellers. The Russian revolution and the dramatic change of the existent social order, with 
its deep implications upon the international system led to an increased interest in research on 
social  organisation,  ideology,  the  Communist  Party’s  organisational  structure,  elites’ 
development and their action in the decision-making process, the army’s organisational model 
and Soviet military doctrines, the hierarchical structure and the psychosocial models of Soviet 
intelligence services.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Western publications are characterized by 
a high number of papers referring to USSR foreign policy. Aware of the fact the ally will turn 
into an enemy and the global game of power will be waged between the United States and the 
Soviet  Union,  the  Westerners  tried  to  find  the  proper  ways  and  means  to  analyse  and 
especially to predict the Soviet behaviour in the international arena.  
We  will  try  to  briefly  present  the  papers  that  are  representative  for  the  reference 
period.  
Volumes, articles, studies in those days are characterised by a various approaches on 
Soviet  politics  in  the  world  arena,  on  USSR’s  ties  within  the  international  state  system, 
including its bilateral and trilateral ties.  Karin MEGHEŞAN , Branduşa ŢEICAN  805 
 
Part  of  the  authors  belonging  to  that  period  put  emphasis  on  the  effects  that  the 
changes in the Russian social and political system had on an international level. Coates W.P. 
(1939), Fisher (1930), Harper ed. (1935), Marques-Riviere (1935), Gruliow ed. (1953)
3  are 
merely a few names of authors whose works represented the basis for further research.  
Other authors (some of whom we already mentioned) studied the specific aspects of 
Soviet foreign policy: Coates (1943), Dulles (1944), Fisher (1946), Konovalov (1945), Sloves 
(1935) or Taracouzio (1938).
4  
One of the most cited authors, Max Beloff, published in 1949  The Foreign Policy of 
Soviet Russia, tackling the issue of Soviet foreign policy from an historical and analytical 
point of view. His study offers the possibility to analyse the Soviet behaviour on the world 
stage  from  various  perspectives.  The  important  chronological  benchmarks  are  intertwined 
with geographic analyses, which represent a synthesis of the works presented before. The 
second volume of this work, it treats Russia’s foreign policy during 1936-1941, starting with 
the events that triggered the disappearance of collective security (Russia and the civil war in 
Spain, Russia and Turkey, AntiComintern Pact, Nyon Conference, Munich, Russia and the 
Far  and  Middle  East)  and  ending  the  period  of  reference  with  a  detailed  analysis  of  the 
political and historical benchmarks at the beginning of the Second World War.  
Another reference work but of a different approach, containing official documents of 
importance to the analysis of the first years of Cold War, as well as personal comments, is 
The Cold War, A Book of Documents, printed by H.L.Trefousse in 1965.
5  
Decades seven and eight of the past century are considered the most prolific from the 
point of view of studies dedicated to the Soviet Union and its foreign policy. Studies of those 
years are mandatory literature: Dallin (1960), Brzezinski (1967), Barrington Moore Jr. (1963), 
Aspaturian (1960, 1966, 1971), Horelick and Rush (1966), Zimmerman (1960), Hoffman and 
Fleron ed. (1971), Ulam (1968), Triska and Finley (1969), Laqueur (1959).
6 
Besides the works of the above mentioned authors, works that are thorough studies, 
analytical approaches on Soviet foreign policy and its relations with other states during the 
“fight” for supremacy, we need to mention other important works and authors who treated 
topics specific to Soviet policy, such as the influence of internal factors upon the foreign 
political  decision-making:  Bialer  (1981),  Schwartz  (1975)
7,  the  military  component  in 
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defining the Soviet Union’s super-power character: Holloway (1983), Dinerstein (1963), Bell 
(1962), Wolfe (1979, 1977), Leebaert (1981), Sokolovsky (1975)
8. 
Another topic of interest for Western studies and research is Kremlin, with all that it 
represents: mysterious centre of Soviet power, hub of the communist elite’s political games, 
of  the  conduct  of  Soviet  foreign  policy,  of  manifestation  of  Soviet  leaders’  various 
behaviours. Among authors preoccupied with Kremlinology we mention: Crankshaw (1966), 
Leonhard  (1962),  Shulman  (1963),  Laites  (1964),  Whitney  (1963),  Bertram  (1957), 
Brzezinsky (1967), Linden (1966), Nove (1975).
9  
Soviet foreign policy decision, the way it was understood or predicted by American 
leaders and the effects certain Soviet decisions had on American foreign policy agenda were 
analysed in all the volumes dedicated to analyses of  American administrations or to the lives 
of American presidents.  
The tight link between the foreign policies of the two super -powers, most of the time 
in a cause-effect relationship, led to deeper analyses of the images and perceptions they had 
towards each other: Schwartz (1977), Welch (1970), Tucker (1963), Finlay, Faget and Holsti 
ed. (1967), De George (1966), Kennan (1961), Macintosh (1962), Hollander (1973).
10  
The literature includes official documents or even fiction that help the general public 
better understand the functioning of the Soviet state apparatus, the use of its interference 
mechanisms in influence spheres, and the link between the Soviet secret services and the 
political power, including the decision-making power in the foreign policy sph ere: Amarlik 
(1970), Kaiser (1974, 1976)
11, De Mille, Le Carre, Colin Forbes, J. Archer.  
The Soviet Union, actor of the international system  
The  first  step  in  attempting  to  understand  the  Soviet  foreign  policy  is  to  clearly 
establish USSR’s place and role as an actor in the international system.  
Paradoxically,  USSR’s  characteristics  on  the  world  stage  were  similar  to  its 
competitors’, the USA and China. The Soviet Union presented all the characteristics of a 
global  power,  the  same  way  the  USA  had  the  same  socio-political  system  as  China. 
Nevertheless, these two important characteristics should not prevent us from considering the 
Soviet Union’s unique character. To reduce the analysis of the Soviet Union to the hypothesis 
that the Soviet state was a dual entity may lead to misinterpretations; moreover, it cannot 
provide fundaments for further predictions.  
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The Soviet Union was in fact a multiple entity whose components were often in a 
conflicting, competitive situation. “Separate interests of these components intermingled, were 
in conflict, sometimes overlapped, and were inspired by a multitude of reasons.”
12  
From a theoretical point of view, the Soviet Union represents the only multiple actor 
on  the  world  stage.  According  to  Aspaturian  (1971),  we  can  identify  five  “distinct 
institutional personalities”: the state, the party, the Russian nation, non-Russian nations, and 
the multinational federation.  
The foreign policy analyst’s misunderstanding might come, according to the quoted 
author, from certain responsibilities and obligations that sometimes led to an erosion of the 
central  role  undertaken  by  the  Soviets  in  politics,  i.e.  that  of  a  hub  of  revolutionary 
movements.  
As  a  world  revolutionary  hub,  the  Soviet  Union  undertook  the  following  roles: 
ideological guardian of the existent socio-political order – the socialist society, initiator and 
architect of its further development – the communist society, ideological and organisational 
leader of all communist parties, a source of inspiration and logistic support of the communist 
movements worldwide.  
The history of role intermingling between the party and the state has always been 
characterized  by  controversies  and  rivalry,  since  each  of  these  “identities  had  a  different 
manner of inspiring, attracting and responding to internal or foreign components.”
13    
The  mission  of the  party  structures  was  to  transform  certain  characteristics  of  the 
international organisation system in order to facilitate the Soviet state’s functioning at its best. 
Paradoxically, the Soviet state adapted to the international organisation system becoming part 
of it, moreover, becoming a global power, therefore the main viable functioning coordinate of 
the system. Consequently, “the fight for the victory of communism” on an international level 
not only did it jeopardize the very existence of the international system, but also undermined 
the global power of the Soviet state.   
The  Russian  nation  is  another  cause  for  confusion  in  the  Soviet  foreign  policy 
analysis. As a historical and juridical successor of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union 
functioned as a heir to the Russian nation’s interests (53% of the USSR’s population was of 
Russian  nationality),  thus  preserved  and  extended  Russian  values,  interests  and  historical 
objectives. Not only were the Russian values and traditions transmitted over, but they also 
acquired  new  dimensions  through  their  assimilation  by  the  Marxist  ideology,  by 
internationalization. The exclusivist national feeling in the Russian tradition has taken several 
forms throughout history: from considering Moscow as “the third Rome” and Mother Russia 
as the place of true orthodox belief, to labelling foreigners as dangerous or subversive; all 
these translated into continuing the state authority’s behaviour from the Tsarist Russia to the 
Bolshevik Russia. In the years 40-50, much of the legislation that regulated Soviet citizens’ 
life was borrowed from the Tsarist period. Peasants couldn’t establish in cities if they didn’t 
have a passport, a citizen of Russian nationality could not establish in Moscow or Leningrad 
without a residence permit, there were travel restrictions for foreign citizens on the Soviet-
Russian territory and severe restrictions regarding the free flow of Soviet-Russian citizens in 
the West.
14     
Foreign Soviet policy radically changed after adopting the 1936 Stalinist constitution. 
The need to present the world a Soviet Union as viable discussion partner for Western 
democracies, the change of foreign policy discourse due to frequent use of the concepts of 
free security, common and indivisible peace represented only intermediary stages in achieving 
the short term goal – to reach the status of world power. 
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Stalin’s heritage  
The Soviet leader Iosif Visarionovici Stalin (Djugashvili), of Georgian origin, raised 
and  educated  in  a  religious  seminar  in  the  spirit  of  maintaining  and  respecting  Mother 
Russia’s traditions, was the one who imposed the first guiding lines of political reconstruction 
in the Soviet Union.  
Imposing severe restrictions and humiliating peasants as a social group, the fear of 
intelligentsia and eliminating all liberal elements from the cultural life (writers, composers, 
directors, ballet dancers, professors, researchers, historians, painters
15), promoting Russian 
nationality in the state apparatus and party elite, blocking any informational contacts with the 
West,  incarcerations  and  assassinations  of  heads  of  the  “glorious”  Soviet  army  –  are  all 
benchmarks of the internal terror started under Stalin’s rule.  
Some  authors
16  consider it possible that S talin’s  governing  concept,  the  despotic 
power he had always desired, the repression and terror that characterized the Soviet society, 
the paranoia and suspicions which had become “characteristics of the state” represent only the 
effects of a hostile foreign environment.  
The foreign policy construct was largely due to the manner in which Stalin perceived 
the outer world and the Soviet Union’s position in it. Suspicious by nature, paranoid, an adept 
of the conspiracy theory and of the permanent existence of possible imperialist plots, Stalin 
had adopted a tough position in the international arena in order to cover what he considered 
Union’s weaknesses.  
Russia’s physical security (analysis of security from a geopolitical point of view) has 
always been linked to the characteristics and size of the territory, the same way psychological 
security was obtained through political centralization.  
On the occasion of the 800
th anniversary of Moscow, Stalin himself declared
17: “The 
importance of Moscow resides in the fact that it became the fundament for unifying a torn 
Russia in a single state having a single government and a single leader. Only a centralized 
state can be able to manifest its independence and force, can achieve spectacular cultural and 
economic progress.”  
Soviet  foreign  policy,  even  during  the  Stalinist  period,  was  characterized  by  two 
conflicting traits: voluntariness and determinism.  
The literature offers us countless controversies linked to the aspects of the changes or 
continuity of Soviet foreign policy in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist period, and the impact of 
internal  or  external  factors  upon  the  Soviet  behaviour  abroad.  Researchers  of  the  Soviet 
society, advocates of the saying “those who ignore the mistakes of the past will repeat them,” 
have tried to identify the elements of continuity and change in the Soviet foreign policy.  
Charles Gati, comparing the Stalinist period with the post-Stalinist one concluded that 
elements of continuity are more significant than those of change. The author admits that the 
changes of the international system in the aftermath of the Second World War triggered deep 
changes both in establishing foreign policy objectives and in the means of achieving them; 
nevertheless,  he  considers  as  USSR’s  constant  trait  the  consolidation  of  a  pragmatic  and 
cautious kind of power, preoccupied preponderantly with competition and cooperation in a 
international environment based on peaceful coexistence. “If there was indeed a behaviour 
model  in  the  Soviet  foreign  policy  from  Lenin  to  Brejnev,  it  was  characterized  by  the 
persistent  yet  cautious  pursuit  of  the  opportunities  offered  by  the  functioning  of  the 
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international system; persistent, since the major objectives of increasing the Soviet influence 
in the world haven’t changed, and cautious, since the Soviet leaders adopted the tactics of 
gradual  and  sometimes  subtle  increase  of  this  influence,  such  as,  more  often  than  not, 
forcefully counteracting this influence by the West seemed unjustified.”
18    
Gati’s  main  argument  in  favour  of  the  continuity  in  the  Soviet  foreign  policy 
hypothesis is that of the differences between the de-Stalinization period criticism on internal 
issues and external policy between the years 1928-1953. The Soviet foreign policy construct 
in  the  Stalinist  period,  construct  based  on  circumspection,  pragmatism,  expansionism, 
preventive behaviour, revolutionary tendencies, or peaceful coexistence, proved to be a useful 
tool for the Soviet interest for such a long period, that it became embedded in the Soviet 
thinking even after Stalin’s death. 
Gati mentions that Russia’s relationship with the West generally remained unchanged 
compared  to  the  Stalinist  period;  it  gained  new  aspects,  the  Union’s  interests  diversified 
(Soviet foreign policies in the Third World), but its refusal to make decisions that could have 
jeopardized its super-power status or the Union’s security on a longer or medium term was 
clearly stated in the Soviet foreign policy even in the post-Stalinist period. Khrushcev used to 
say: “Imperialists consider us Stalinists. Yes, when we speak of the fight against imperialists, 
we are Stalinisits.”
19 
Gati considers that the general opinion that the Soviet foreign policy was characterized 
by changes is mainly due to the Soviet behaviour during World War II and its aftermath. The 
expansion and unprecedented aggression era in the Soviet foreign policy construct began with 
imposing its domination in the Eastern Europe, causing the Berlin crisis, the tensions linked to 
imposing the Marshall plan; all these coordinates are completed with harsh discourses and 
international political behaviour that could hardly be called diplomatic.  
We can conclude at the end of our presentation that Stalin was an adept of Realpolitik; 
his perception upon the international reality was not that affected by ideology as one could 
expect.  Personal  experience  and  psycho-biographical  traits,  the  characteristics  of  a  new 
reconfiguration of the international system and the heritage of the great Russian empire – all 
these were imprinted upon his perception of the international environment reality and of the 
place the Soviet Union had or could have on the world stage. From the point of view of 
actions taken, Stalin had always represented a cautious guard of Russia’s interests; and when 
we say cautious, we mainly think of those diplomatic compromises, of the ability to sacrifice 
certain ideological interests for the much more valuable national interest.  
Stalin’s  foreign  policy  movements  were  many  a  time  contradictory  (from  his 
relationship  with  Chaing  Kai-shek  Kuomingang  and  the  organisation  of  multiparty  free 
elections in Bulgaria and Hungary, up to supporting the Sionist movement during an anti-
Semite internal campaign). Paradoxically, Stalin is the one who offered a new interpretation 
to the older concept of “antagonistic contradictions”, according to which communism and 
capitalism will never coexist without conflict. 
According to Adam Ulam,
20 during his last years, Stalin “created a tension that not 
only did it represent a potential threat, but it also proved useless.” In other words, during his 
last years, sickness, age, paranoia and a permanent psychic tension typical of Kremlin, made 
Stalin abandon his pragmatism and compromise less in international relations. 
Soviet foreign policy aggression in the aftermath of World War II is partly due to new 
geopolitical opportunities. The expansionist foreign policy, which at the time meant achieving 
national interest objectives, proved inefficient on a medium and long term. The aggressive 
                                                 
18 N. Khrushcev, in Thomas Whitney, ed. Khrushcev, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963, p.2. 
19 N. Khrushcev, in Thomas Whitney, ed. Khrushcev, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1963, p.2. 
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expansionism for the control of influence areas was nothing but the trigger of the sceptical, 
even paranoid behaviour that would lead to a wrong perception of the other.
21 
The term that can best characterize the way Stalin perceived international policy is 
“mobilization”,  a  term  which  has  both  political  and  military  connotations.
22  William 
Zimmerman, who often polemicized with advocates of the continuity and inflexibility of the 
Soviet foreign policy, considered that this idea of continuity only leads to denying the 
moderate character of the Soviet foreign policy after the 50s and its effect was maintaining a 
tough line in its policy of confining the USA. 
Along  years,  analysts  of  Soviet  foreign  policy  were  split  between  sceptics  and 
believers,  with  respect  to  USSR’s  structural  ability  to  adapt  under  the  influence  of  other 
international  actors.  Zimmerman  considered  that  one  of  the  main  changes  in  the  Soviet 
foreign policy in the 70s is triggered by a redefining of the Soviet elites’ perception on the 
international environment.
23 The author considers that this change in perspective and in the 
Soviet foreign policy is due to its ability to influence the West, especially the United States, a 
sign of structural adaptability of the Soviet behaviour. 
3. Conclusions 
This  comparative  analysis  of  the  works  dedicated  to  understanding  the  Soviet 
behaviour in the Cold War era leads us to conclude that at the time – today as well – the West 
was/is unable to grasp the intimate drives of the functioning of the Russian “soul”, it was 
unable to understand the intrinsic motivations of Soviet foreign policy decision. This gap in 
our understanding wouldn’t be so dangerous if we hadn’t been speaking today of a new cold 
war, a much more dangerous one, since we are witnesses to new instability hotbeds, to history 
wounds which have been opened once again, to an escalation of extremism and nationalism, 
to new ideological conflicts.  
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